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This paper examines the determinants of the budgets that the severely resource constrained state prose-
cutors of the United States receive from mostly the local governments. In doing so, this paper contributes
to the existing literature, which has so far treated prosecutorial budget as exogenously given. The theo-
retical model of this paper provides a framework to understand the key factors involved in determining
the prosecutorial budgets and provides policy implications such as a more ecient way to reduce crime
is to provide the prosecutors with right incentives to work for society's best interest than to provide
them with more budgets. The main empirical results of the paper are as follows. Prosecutorial bud-
get decreases with an increase in the level of political conservatism as measured by the percentage of
votes that President Bush won in November 2000 election. Also, other things remaining the same, the
non-elected prosecutors (who face less political pressure) get more budget, prosecute less cases, and have
lower conviction rates.
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Prosecutors are important because of two reasons. Firstly prosecutors play a pivotal role in
the criminal justice systems of the common law countries such as the United States. They are
aptly called the 'gatekeepers of the criminal justice system'. Arrests alone do not deter criminals
unless they are followed most of the times by convictions in courts and consequent punishments.
Prosecutors, on behalf of the society, ensure that justice is done. Secondly, prosecutors wield
great discretionary powers. They have complete discretion, with almost no oversight, over whom
to charge for a crime and the nature of those charges, when and under what circumstances to
reduce or drop certain charges, whether to oer a plea bargain and the nature of plea bargain,
and when to drop the charges all together. In the common law countries, the judges are supposed
to be impartial. Therefore, they do not supervise the routine work of the prosecutors as long as
the rules and regulations are seemingly followed. In the civil law tradition, which is followed in
most European countries, the judge does most of questioning during the trial and the prosecutor
acts as his assistant. The main job of the prosecutor in a civil law court is to gather all the facts
and information of the case. The common law prosecutors, however, enjoy much autonomy and
discretionary power. Sometimes these powers are abused as in the case of lacrosse players of
Duke University.
Given the above mentioned importance of the prosecutors and the responsibilities and powers
that the they carry, it is important to study closely and critically the factors that aect their
decisions, how they allocate their resources among competing cases and programs, the amount
of resources at their disposal, the political pressure they face to maintain a high conviction rate,
and selsh motives, if any, which may lead to decisions and actions that are not in society's
best interest. For example, too much political pressure to maintain a high win rate can lead a
prosecutor trying to convict even innocent people. If they do not get right incentives to work for
society's best interest, they may take cases that are not high priority (from society's viewpoint)
but will bring fame to the prosecutors. This, in turn, will help them to get elected or appointed
to higher political oces.
In the United States, there are two types of prosecutors, federal prosecutors and state prose-
cutors. The federal prosecutors prosecute the cases resulting from violations of the federal laws,
while the state prosecutors handle the cases that result from violations of the state laws. Since
most criminal activities come under the jurisdiction of state laws, the state prosecutors handle
1a lot of more cases than the federal prosecutors. Both types of prosecutors are funded by their
respective governments.
The federal prosecutors are well funded because they get their budgets from the auent
federal government. However, the state prosecutors, despite being saddled with more cases,
are funded poorly by the local governments (and sometimes state governments) because these
governments themselves have been struggling scally in the last two decades or so. The state
prosecutors compete for funds with other local services such as road repair and garbage collec-
tion. Due to such poor funding, the state prosecutors are unable to take cases in which the
evidence is strong or they have to oer overly generous plea bargains. Needless to say that this
is detrimental to the eorts of keeping the crime rate low.
The existing literature on prosecutors tells us that the prosecutors allocate dierent amounts
of resources to dierent cases based on the probability of winning in each case and relative im-
portance of winning each case for society. For example, from society's point of view, it is more
important to convict a guilty defendant in a murder case than in a theft case. However, the
existing literature treats the budgets of the prosecutors as exogenously determined. The alloca-
tion of the budget to dierent competing cases itself depends on the magnitude of the available
budget. If more budget is available, the prosecutor will be able to take more ambitious cases
where the probability of winning is smaller, but the expected societal benet from a conviction
is greater. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the main determinants of the
prosecutorial budgets.
Even though the functioning of prosecutors is so important in understanding how the criminal
justice system works, the research that has been done so far on prosecutors is scant. There are
three strands of the existing literature on the American prosecutors. One strand, which is also
the oldest, has examined the prosecutorial decisions to prosecute and allocation of resources to
dierent cases. There is no agency problem. The prosecutor always acts in society's best interest.
The second and more recent strand incorporates the agency problem and then investigates how
the agency problem colors the decisions of the prosecutors. The third strand of the literature
is written by legal scholars and published mostly in law journals. One of the recurring topics
of this strand of literature is the debate whether the extensive discretionary powers enjoyed by
American prosecutors are good or bad. Comparison with legal systems of other countries and
abstract principles of jurisprudence are used in the debate rather than equations and gures.
The suggestions for change range from adopting the civil law system of the European countries
2to making minor adjustments in the current system.
The rst strand of the literature was started by Becker (1968). Even though it deals with
crime and optimal punishment and not prosecutors, it made people realize the usefulness of
economic analysis for such issues. Landes (1971) is the pioneering paper in this strand of litera-
ture. It showed that prosecutors will devote more resources to cases where spending additional
money will increase the chances of winning and to the cases which are in society's best interest
to win, like cases involving heinous crimes such as murders. Rhodes (1976) proved the results of
Landes (1971) with additional variables such as prosecutor's and defendant's legal strengths and
court delays. This paper also provides additional insights such as there will be an increase in the
number of plea bargains when there are more court delays or when the prosecutors are burdened
with more cases. So plea bargain acts as a `market clearing device'. Forst and Brosi (1977)
incorporated dynamic element in the model. Some of the defendants are recidivist. The prose-
cutors acting in society's best interest should devote more resources to convict these defendants
and get a higher sentence for them because it will reduce the expected future stream of crime.
The second strand of this literature incorporated agency problem and made the models more
realistic. Cole (1970) is a pioneering work for this strand of literature. He did a case study of
King county of Seattle, Washington and showed the complex web of interconnections among the
prosecutor and police, judges, prison wardens, defense lawyers, and community leaders. The
prosecutor's action aects and is aected by dierent groups who are also involved in criminal
justice system. For example, when the prisons get overcrowded, the judges reduce sentences
for minor crimes, the prosecutors do not prosecute minor cases, and the police do not arrest
for such crimes knowing that the prosecutors will not take such cases. Glaeser et. al. (2000)
showed that the federal prosecutors are more likely to take the cases of drug related oenses
if the defendant has high human capital or is suciently rich to hire a good defense attorney.
Taking such cases where the defense attorneys are good helps to hone the trial skills of the
prosecutors and the prosecutors can also make connections with lawyers of reputed law rms,
which may be useful if and when they change careers. Gordon and Huber (2002) discusses in
detail the incentives that the prosecutors face, their own personal agenda, and the actions they
take under these incentives. They conclude that even when the voters do not know the facts of
each individual case, the voters should still press for higher conviction rates from prosecutors
because this will induce the prosecutors to work hard, seek the truth in each case, without
unnecessarily inducing the prosecutors to try to convict innocent defendants. Boylan (2005)
3studied 570 federal prosecutors from 1969 to 2000 and concluded that the federal prosecutors
strive to maximize the total prison sentence. Maximizing the total prison sentences leads to
favorable career outcomes for US attorneys, while high conviction rates do not seem to aect
the career outcomes.
The third strand of literature is written mostly by legal scholars and published in legal
journals. A good survey paper on this strand of literature is Misner (1996), which explains
in detail the discretionary powers of prosecutors in the United States. Johnson (2001) and
Saxonhouse (2001) compare and contrast the Japanese legal system with the American legal
system, including the powers of the prosecutors. Another paper worth mentioning is Pizzi (1993),
which refutes the call of some scholars to reduce the discretionary powers of the American
prosecutors and to make them comparable to those wielded by the European prosecutors. This
paper says that the common law and the civil law systems are very dierent and why it is not
possible to borrow a few aspects of the one and incorporate them in the other system, while
leaving the other things as before. For example, the prosecutor does not have much discretionary
powers in the civil law system because the judge in that system has a lot of power. The judge
in civil law system actively participates in the interrogation/cross-examination of the defendant
during the trial and can drop charges or bring additional charges at any point during the trial.
My paper contributes to the above literature by studying the factors that determine the
amounts of prosecutorial budgets and not just its allocation among competing uses once it has
been exogenously determined. The allocation itself depends on the magnitude of the budget.
When the budget is small, all or most of the resources will go to absolute necessities. This
paper develops a theoretical framework that captures the key determinants of the prosecutorial
budgets. It also includes the agency problem where the prosecutor may not act in society's
best interest. I have derived predictions and policy implications from the theoretical model
such as the implication that providing the prosecutors with right incentives (for example, by
pressurizing him to maintain a high conviction rate) is more eective in reducing crime than to
provide the prosecutors with additional budgets.
I have also undertaken econometric analysis using a dataset that I constructed by combining
data from various sources. The core of the data for this study comes from the Census of
Prosecutors, 2001 which was conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. This is the rst
and only survey of its kind that obtained information from the oces of all the prosecutors
across the United States. Earlier surveys and subsequent surveys did not cover all the districts.
4DeFrances (2001), (2002), and (2003) have described this data in detail. I have augmented this
data with key demographic and economic data about the prosecutorial districts that I have
taken from various sources such as the Bureau of Census and Uniform Crime Report of the
FBI. Appendix B provides the details of sources of data and denitions of dierent variables
used in empirical analysis. The empirical analysis veried the predictions from the theoretical
models and resolved issues that a priori cannot be resolved using the theoretical model such
as the eect of increase in political conservatism (as measured by the number of votes that
President Bush won in November 2000 election) of a district on the prosecutorial budgets. On
the one hand, the conservative voters want to be tougher on crime. But on the other hand,
they want smaller bureaucracies (and lower taxes). The empirical analysis in this paper shows
that the net result of these two opposing eects is a decrease in the prosecutorial budget with
an increase in political conservatism. Another important nding of this paper is that, other
things remaining the same, the non-elected prosecutors (who face less political pressure) get
more budget, prosecute less cases, and have lower conviction rates. This result conrms the
policy implication from the theoretical model of this paper that the prosecutors will not work
eciently if they do not face adequate political pressure to keep the crime rate lower.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives essential background information about
the state prosecutors. Section 3 outlines the theoretical models. Section 4 contains the discussion
of empirical analysis including the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The State Prosecutors
A Public Prosecutor is a legal ocer who represents the government in criminal proceedings1.
The State Prosecutors represent state governments in proceedings that result from violation of
state laws. State Prosecutors are also known as District Attorneys or Public Prosecutors in many
counties. In the United States, state prosecutors can be appointed by the state governments or
elected by the local voters of a prosecutorial district. States of Alaska, Connecticut, New Jersey,
and also District of Columbia have appointed state prosecutors.
The institutional process of determining budgets of prosecutors proceeds as follows. Prose-
cutors complete forms that the funding agencies require. The prosecutors indicate through these
forms how much money they will need for the next scal year. These forms solicit details of all
the programs run by the prosecutorial oce such as program for prosecuting recidivist criminals
1Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition
5or providing counseling to the victims. The budgets in most districts are 'zero-based', which
means that each year the prosecutor has to justify continuation of each program. Just because
a program received funding in the previous year, it does not mean that it will receive funding
in the next year. Prosecutors employ accountants and keep a detailed account of expenses of
their oces. After prosecutors have submitted the forms, the local government decides how
much budget to allocate to the local prosecutor. In most cases, this amount is less than what
the prosecutor has requested. The prosecutor, formally, does not have a say in determination of
budget beyond requesting a certain amount of budget. However, informally, prosecutors engage
vigorously in lobbying and propaganda for getting higher allocation of budget.
Prosecutors are mostly funded by the local governments (county and the city governments),
even though sometimes they may also receive funding from the state and federal governments. In
the last few years, the local and the state governments are facing severe nancially constraints.
This has led to budgetary cuts for the prosecutors. Enterprising prosecutors look for funding
opportunities from all possible sources such as getting grants from federal governments and big
corporations for special programs. However, all these activities take away some of their time
and attention from trials and plea bargaining.
The prosecutors have a great amount of discretionary power over whom to prosecute and
whom not to prosecute. There is virtually no oversight for their power in deciding whom not to
prosecute. Their discretionary power to decide whom to prosecute can in principle be reviewed
by the State Attorney General in most states. Another interesting feature of the American
criminal justice system is that most of the criminal cases end in plea bargains. Baker and
Mezzetti(2001) study the various issues involved in plea bargaining. The most important factor
in plea bargaining is the credible threat by the prosecutor to go to trial if the defendant does
not accept the plea bargain. However, a prosecutor with meager budget may not sound very
credible in his threat. Thus, even plea bargaining (both the number and the nature of pleas) is
aected by the amount of resources available to the prosecutors.
3 Theoretical Models
In this section, I develop a simple baseline model and then a more elaborate one, which
captures most of the important issues involved in the determination of budgets of state pros-
ecutors. I derive policy implications and testable hypotheses based on these models and then
use empirical analysis to see if the data supports the predictions of the models.
63.1 Baseline Model
There are two players, the social planner and the prosecutor, who are involved in a two
period game. The timeline of the game is given in Figure 1. In the rst period, the social
planner moves and decides how much budget he should provide to the prosecutor. In the second
period, the prosecutor decides how much of this budget to spend on combating crime and how
much of it to spend on his own agenda such as higher salary for himself and his sta, hiring
excessive and unnecessary support sta, or using his oce as a launching pad to run for a higher
political oce.
[Figure 1 here]
The objective function of the social planner is
max
B
U = f(c   c( R(B) )) + g(X   B) ; (1)
where U is the aggregate utility of the social planner, B is the budget that the social planner
provides to the prosecutor, X is the total amount of resources available to the social planner,
f(:) is the utility derived from a lower crime rate c relative to an critical level of crime rate c,
R is the actual amount of resources that the prosecutor will spend on combating crime where
R  B, g(:) is the utility that the prosecutor derives from spending on a composite good
that includes things such as roads and schools. The more budget the social planner gives to
the prosecutor, the less resources he has left to spend on the composite good. The functions
f(:), g(:), and therefore their sum U(:) are strictly increasing, concave, and twice dierentiable
functions everywhere as long as c < c. When the crime rate c is greater than or equal to the
critical rate c, then f(:) =  1.
The critical level of crime rate c depends on the society's underlying norms and socio-
economic conditions. It is a level of crime at which there will be a great social unrest and the
social planner (and also the prosecutor) will get innitely large negative utility from it. The
function f(:) is similar to Stone-Geary utility function, which gives an innitely large negative
utility when the consumption of a necessity good is less than the subsistence level. Thus, the
social planner (and the prosecutor) will strive to keep the crime rate below the critical level.
The objective function of the prosecutor is,
max
R
V = h(c   c(R(B))) + k(B   R) ; (2)
7subject to
R  B
where V is the aggregate utility of the prosecutor, R is the amount of resources that prosecu-
tor will spend on combating crime. Functions h(:), k(:), and hence their sum V (:) are increasing,
concave, twice dierentiable, and bounded everywhere. Therefore, prosecutor gets a diminishing
marginal utility. In other words, when the actual crime exceeds or is equal to the critical level
of crime then the prosecutor derives a large negative utility. This is because at such a level of
crime rate, he will lose his job and losing the job for this reason will also be harmful for his
future career. Thus, the rst priority of the prosecutor is to keep the crime rate comfortably
below the critical level of crime, c.
The actual crime rate is endogenous in the theoretical models (and also in the empirical
analysis). The crime rate declines as the prosecutors spends more resources R to combat crime.
Therefore, c0(R) < 0. However, as the prosecutor spends more and more money on ghting
crime, there are diminishing returns so that c00(R) > 0.
Since this model is a nite period game, it can be solved using backward induction. In the
second stage of the game, prosecutor gets a budget B from the social planner. He solves his
utility maximization problem treating B as exogenous and calculates the R that will maximize
prosecutor's utility. The social planner, looking ahead and having the rst mover's advantage,
takes into account the R(B) and decides B that will maximize his own utility.
Denition 1: The equilibrium is dened by a (B;R) such that
1. B = argmax
B
f(c   c(R(B))) + g(X   B):
2. R = argmax
R
h(c   c(R)) + k(B   R):
In words the equilibrium is dened as follows: Let B maximizes the utility of the social planner
and R maximizes the utility of the prosecutor for a given Bast. The social planner assigns a
budget B to the prosecutor.
Lemma 1: The equilibrium as dened in Denition 1 exists. Moreover, when h0(c c(R)) [ c0(R)] >
k0(B   R), 8 R 2 [0;B] then R = B.
8Proof. See appendix A.
Lemma 1 says that when the crime rate will be close to critical level of crime, then the
prosecutor will devote all the budget to combating crime and R = B. In other words, there
will be a corner solution.
Proposition 1: 0 <
dR
dB < 1 when 9 R 2 [0;B] such that h0(c c(R))  c0(R) = k0(B R).
But if h0(c   c(R)) [ c0(R)] > k0(B   R) 8 R 2 [0;B], then
dR
dB = 1 and
d2R
dB2 = 0
Proof. See appendix A.
Once the crime rate is comfortably below relative to the critical level, the prosecutor will
start spending some of the resources on his own interests. But as long as the crime rate is
around the critical level, he will spend all the budget he gets on ghting crime. An important
policy implication of this proposition is that the social planner should not scally discipline a
prosecutor when the crime rate is fairly high. This is because when the crime rate is high, the
prosecutor will spend all the available resources to lower the crime rate. But lack of funds under
these circumstances will make him ineective. The common practice in many areas, however,
is to give the prosecutor somewhat less than what he asks for. If a prosecutor will ask for, say
$100, the local government will give him $ 95 (irrespective of factors such as the prevailing crime









Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 2 says that as the critical level of crime rate increases, the prosecutor will spend
less money on reducing the actual crime rate and more on his own agenda because his utility
depends on the dierence between the actual and critical crime rate. An exogenous increase in
c will be a windfall gain to the prosecutor. An increase in the critical crime rate also increases






Proof. See appendix A.
This proposition shows that when the resources of the social planner increase, he will give
more budget to the prosecutor.
3.2 A Model with Additional Parameters
The utility of the social planner is
 [ f(c   c( 
R(B) )) ] + g(X()   B) ; (3)
where  2 [0;1] is a parameter that measures the political conservatism of the social planner
and it scales up his utility derived from having lower crime rate. Higher values of  means
that the social planner is more conservative. It is also apparent from the equation (3) that the
utility of the social planner from low crime increases, as  increases. However,  also aects X,
the total amount of resources available to the social planner because more conservative social




In the present model, the utility of the prosecutor is
[ h(c   c(
R)) ] + k(B   R) ; (4)
where  2 [0;1] scales the utility of the prosecutor and 
 scales the eectiveness of the
resources spent on combating crime, R. The discount factor  is a measure of political pressure
that the prosecutor feels to keep the level of crime low. However, the , the less pressure
prosecutor feels. Another parameter introduced in the present model is 
 2 [0;1] that measures
the eectiveness of resources deployed to combat crime. A lower 
 will reduce the eectiveness
of resources. It will take more resources to achieve same amount of reduction in crime rate for
a lower value of 
. For example, a district with a large urban area will have more complicated
crimes such as organized criminal gangs activity and thus it will require more resources to reduce
the crime rate. Similarly, a district where the total area is quite large will require more resources
to combat crime.
10Denition 2: The equilibrium in the model with additional parameters is dened by a (B;R)
such that
1. B = argmax
B
 [f(c   c( 
R(B) )) ] + g(X   B):
2. R = argmax
R
 [h(c   c(
R)) ] + k(B   R):
In words the equilibrium is dened as follows: Let B maximizes the utility of the social plan-
ner and R maximizes the utility of the prosecutor for a given B. The social planner assigns
a budget B to the prosecutor. The prosecutor then spends R(B) on combating crime and
B   R(B) on this own agenda.
Lemma 2: An equilibrium as dened in Denition 2 exists for the model with additional
parameters. When  h0(c   c(
R)) [ (c0(
R))] 
 > k0(B   R), 8 R 2 [0;B] then R = B,
otherwise R < B.
Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 4: The eect of an increase in 
 on R is ambiguous. That is, R can increase
or decrease with an increase in 
.
Proof. See appendix A.
This propositions says that an exogenous change in the eectiveness of the resources will
result in the prosecutor spending either more or less proportion of his budget on ghting crime
than before when there was interior solution before. For example, let us consider the eect of
an increase in the eectiveness of resources. On the one hand, because the resources are more
eective, the prosecutor can devote less resources to ghting crime and yet he will still be able
to maintain the same crime rate. One the other hand, since the eectiveness of resources has
increased, he may devote more resources towards ghting crime to get higher utility. If there
was a corner solution before and the eectiveness of the resources 
 decrease further, then the











 > k0(B R) 8R 2 [0;B], an increase or a same decrease
in  will have not increase B   R. However, a suciently large decrease in  will result in
an increase in B   R.
Proof. See appendix A.
The utility derived by the prosecutor from a low crime rate is discounted by , the discount
factor. It represents the political pressure that a prosecutor faces from either the voters or his
political masters to keep the crime rate comfortably below the critical level. The lower the ,
the less inclined will be the prosecutor to spend money on reducing the crime rate after the
crime rate has become comfortably below the critical level. Since a reduction in  means that
if the social planner wants to achieve a certain crime rate, he will have to give extra money to
the prosecutor, so that the amount of resources on combating crime R remains the same. A
policy implication of this proposition is that instead of giving the prosecutor extra money to
ensure that the crime rate remains the same, it is better to increase  by policy functions. A
prosecutor in this model spends R out of B. If the ratio R=B decreases, then the prosecutor will
become more inecient. A better way to correct the situation is to ensure that the prosecutor
has enough incentives to make sure that the crime rate stays low.
Proposition 6 The eect of an increase in  on B is ambiguous. That is, B can increase or
decrease with an increase in .
Proof. See appendix A.
There are two opposing eects that come into play when , the level of political conser-
vatism, increases. On the one hand, the social planner will get more utility from a low crime
rate. On the other hand, the social planner will have lower resources available because of his
preferences for collecting lower tax revenues. The net eect of these opposing forces is unknown
in the theoretical model. It can only be known through empirical investigation.
124 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis in this paper consists of running regressions with the prosecutorial
budget as the dependent variable and relevant demographic and economic variables as the
independent variables. The signs, the magnitudes, and the level of signicance of these variables
provide clues for the relationship between the variables. We can use these to nd support
for the theoretical model introduced in this paper and get additional insights. Since crime
is an endogenous variable, the estimates from Ordinary Least Squares will not be consistent.
Therefore, I have used two stage least square (2SLS or IV) and limited information maximum
likelihood to get consistent estimates. The estimates from these equations are given in table
10 and the elasticities based on these regressions are given in table 11. Using these regression
techniques necessitates the availability of valid instrument for the endogenous variables. I have
discussed these in subsection (4.1). The regression techniques 2SLS and LIML give similar
results in large data. That is, they are asymptotically equivalent. Two stage least squares
is easier to explain and compute, but LIML has the advantage of being invariant to scaling
of variables. The word 'Limited' alludes to the fact that we are only estimating one equation
instead of the whole system of equation. Limited Information Maximum Likelihood is equivalent
to Two Stage Least Squares, while Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) is equivalent
to Three Stage Least Squares where we use the information about the relationship among the
errors of dierent equations to get a more ecient estimate. Since I have only one equation in my
analysis and not a full system of equations, Two Stage Least Squares and Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood is the best I can do. For further information about LIML and FIML,
please see Greene (2002), pp. 133-134.
I have done robustness check by running regressions using the logarithm of variables, by
dividing the prosecutorial districts rst into large population and small population groups and
then into rich and poor districts. I have used both the 2SLS and LIML for these regressions.
Then I run 2SLS and LIML for using logarithm of the prosecutorial budget and the logarithm
of the independent variables. Taking the log of variables improves the symmetry and reduces
the range, but it is a more restrictive model. The elasticity in this model is always constant.
Since it is a not a good idea to use a more restrictive model unless there are good theoretical
justications, I did not use log-log model for my main regressions, but only for robustness check.
In order to do the empirical analysis, I have created a dataset by combining data from
13dierent publicly available datasets. Please see Appendix C for the details of the sources of
dataset, description of these sources, and the denition of the variables used in this paper.
The main source of data is Census of Prosecutors(2001). I augmented this from the economic
and demographic variables taken from sources such as Uniform Crime Report of the FBI, the
US Bureau of Census, and the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American
University.
All the data except from the Census of Prosecutors was available at the level of state counties.
I aggregated these to the level of state prosecutorial district that may consist of one or more
counties. None of the variables except the prosecutorial budget is scaled. The prosecutorial
budget is in thousands of dollars.
4.1 Description of Data
Prosecutorial budgets vary much across districts. The median prosecutorial budget was
320,000 while the average budget was 2,087,007. This indicates a positively skewed distribution.
Also, the coecient of variation was 5.53, which is quite high. Coecient of variation is a
better measure of dispersion when comparing two or more dierent variables. It is calculated
by dividing the standard deviation with the mean and multiplying it by 100. The only variable
that has a higher coecient of variable is crime. Its coecient of variation is 5.90.
[Tables 1A and 1B here]
Histograms of prosecutorial budget and the logarithm of prosecutorial budget are given in
gures 1 and 2 respectively. As we can see, the prosecutorial budget has a huge range and is
highly right skewed. After we take logarithm of this variable, it becomes fairly symmetric and
starts to resemble normal distribution.
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
The average population of a prosecutorial district was 116,346 in 2001. The median popu-
lation was 35,765. The average of number of index crimes reported in a prosecutorial district
in 2001 was 846 while the median was 143. Since these variables are also highly right skewed,
I have also made histogram of the logarithm of these variables. The histogram of the loga-
rithms appear more symmetric. The histograms of population and number of index crimes in
the original scales and the logarithmic scales are given in gure 3,4,5, and 6.
14[Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 here]
Figure 5 contains a histogram of the logarithm of per-capita income, while gure 6 contains
a histogram of the logarithm of the proportion of votes President Bush won in November 2000.
[Figures 7 and 8 here]
I have also drawn a scatter plot between the prosecutorial budget and important independent
variables on a logarithmic scale. Drawing on a logarithmic scale brings out a better picture of
the relationship between the variables because it reduces the range and right skewness of these
variables. We can see from these scatter plots that there is a strong linear relationship. The
only exception is the scatter plot between the prosecutorial budget and the percentage of votes
that President Bush won in November 2000. Here the linear relationship is somewhat weaker.
[Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 here]
Detailed descriptive statistics for all the variables used in regressions are given in table
1A. Table 1B describes the categorical variables such as whether or not a district belongs to
a Metropolitan Statistical Area, whether or not the prosecutor is elected or appointed, and
whether or not he takes civil cases.
Table 2 provides tenth, twenty-fth (the rst quartile), ftieth (the median), seventy-fth
(third quartile), and ninetieth percentiles of all variables used in regressions. Percentiles are
useful in giving us clues about the shape of the variables. As we can clearly see from these
percentiles, most of the variables are right skewed. In other words, most variables have a few
observations that are very large. These observations are the large metropolitan cities such as
New York and Chicago.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 provides the frequency distribution table of years the current prosecutor has been
in oce. As we can see from this table, a majority of prosecutors are either new or have less
than ten years of experience. Only a few prosecutors have been in oce beyond twenty years.
There is even one prosecutor who remained in oce for forty years. In most of the prosecutorial
districts, the prosecutors are elected. Therefore, remaining in oce for twenty years or more is
quite a feat.
15[Table 4 here]
Table 4 provides the frequency distribution of the prosecutorial budget in various districts,
which is the topic of this paper. We can immediately see a wide variation. About 400 districts
have a budget of less than one hundred thousand dollars, while about 10 districts have a budget
of over ten million dollars. Thus, the data is fairly right skewed. This also becomes apparent
from gure 2.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 provides the frequency distribution table of the population variable. As we can see
from this table, the population is highly right skewed. There are a few districts with large
populations, while rest of the districts have small or medium populations.
In Table 6 we can see the large variation in the prosecutorial budget, which is the topic of
the paper. About 400 districts have prosecutorial budgets that are less than $100,000, while
there are 10 districts that have prosecutorial budgets of more than $ 10,000,000.
[Table 6 here]
Table 7 shows the frequency tables of the per-capita income. As we can see, most districts
in the year 2000 have per-capita income between $15,000 and $20,000. This is also clear from
gure 8 that shows the plot of the per-capita income.
[Table 7 here]
Table 8 provides the aggregate number of `index crimes' across the United States. Please
see Appendix B for denition of this variable. This is a large variation in index crimes across
the United States as we can see from this table.
[Table 8 here]
Table 9 provides the number of districts in dierent states. This number varies from 1 in
Alaska, District of Columbia, and Rhodes Island to 155 in Texas. States with larger areas and
more population have more prosecutorial districts. The states where each prosecutorial district
consists of only one county also have more prosecutorial districts than those states where the
prosecutorial districts consist mostly of two or more districts.
[Table 9 here]
164.2 Endogeneity Issues
As the theoretical model postulates, the crime rate of a district is endogenous as it is the
very variable that the prosecutorial budget is supposed to aect. A higher crime rate results in
a larger budget, while a larger budget is more likely to result in lower crime rate. The latter
happens because higher budget results in more prosecutions of criminals. This, in turn, reduces
the supply of criminals in society and discourages would-be criminals.
One implication of the crime rate being endogenous is that the OLS estimates will not
be consistent. We need at least one valid (and strong) instrument to enable us to run IV or
2SLS regressions. I have used the percentage of males in a district between 16 to 24 years,
percentage of the population in a district that is employed, percentage of males in a district
with no schooling, and percentage of houses in a district that are unoccupied in a district. I
have also tried using other variables such as population in a district that lives below poverty
line as instruments for the crime rate. But I ultimately did not use them in my nal regressions
because they were causing multicollinearity in the rst stage regressions.
These instruments turn out to be strong. A rule of thumb is that if at the rst stage
regression the F statistic is more than 10 then instruments are deemed as strong. The F
statistic for the rst stage regression of crime rate is more than 100. The Anderson Canonical
Test for weak instruments also shows beyond doubt that these instruments are strong and there
is no under-identication of the endogenous variable(crime rate). Since I have more instruments
than the number of endogenous variables, I also conducted a test for overidentifying restrictions
(Sargan-Hansen test). The null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected at
any plausible level of signicance because of high p-values. In other words, this test could reject
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This is the best outcome that is possible
because we can never accept a null hypothesis.
4.3 Results and Discussion
Two stage least squares estimation with prosecutorial budget as dependent variable
Table 1 shows the result of regressions that includes all the districts in our dataset. The
dependent variable is the prosecutorial budget that is in unit of thousands of dollars. Column
(1) provides the OLS estimates, while columns (2) and (3) provide respectively the Instrumental
Variables (IV) or the Two stage least squares (2SLS) and the Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) estimates. The OLS estimates in column (1) are unlikely to be consistent
17but are provided for comparison. By looking carefully at columns(2) and (3) one can see that
the prosecutorial budget decreases with the increase in percentage of votes won by President
Bush in November 2000 elections. This resolves the uncertainty that Proposition 6 described,
namely, the direction of change in prosecutorial budget when the level of political conservatism
changes. On the one hand, more conservative districts prefer being strict toward crime, and will
thus fund the prosecutors well. On the other hand, the more conservative districts like lower
taxes and lower bureaucracies. Due to this reason, the prosecutors are likely to get less money
in conservative districts. Thus, it was not clear a priori what will be the net result of these
opposing eects. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 show that the net result is negative and the
prosecutorial budget will decline with increase in the level of political conservatism. We can
see from these columns that the appointed prosecutors get more budget, other things remaining
the same including controlling the state xed eects and the per-capita income. This suggests
that the prosecutors, chosen by the state governments, have good connections with the funding
agencies. Ramseyer, Rasmusen, and Raghav(2006) shows that the appointed prosecutors also
prosecute less cases and even achieve less conviction rate. Thus, to sum up, the non-elected
prosecutors get more budget, prosecute less cases, and have lower conviction rates, other things
remaining the same. This conrms Proposition 4 of the theoretical model in this paper which
says that when the prosecutors have less pressure to maintain a low crime rate, they are more
likely to spend the budget on their own agenda, which may not be in society's best interest.
We also see from the regression that the budget increases with the total area of a district.
This is because a more spread out geographical area requires more money to work eectively.
The prosecutorial budget also increases with crime and the per-capita income of a district. The
latter measures the auence of a district. The prosecutorial budget decreases with term of
oce of the prosecutor. This is probably because the smaller the number of years a prosecutor
is appointed or elected to oce, the higher the money spent on elections and thus, less resources
are available for budget. Also, the prosecutors who have smaller terms of oce are likely to
have smaller political clout. The LIML gives the lowest R2 of the three regression of 0.46. The
2SLS regression has an R2 of 0.54.
[Table 10 here]
Table 11 provides the elasticities for all the independent variables regressions in Table 10 at
their mean value. The p-value of variables in dierent regressions is also provided next to the
18elasticities. We can see that the elasticity of budget with respect to per-capita income is 1.201.
This means a percent increase in per-capita income will result in 1.201% increase in prosecutorial
budget. A percent increase in percentage of votes that President Bush won in November 2000
will result in a decrease of 0.163% in the prosecutorial budget. One percent increase in Index
crimes will result in 0.684 percent increase in the prosecutorial budget.
[Table 11 here]
4.4 Robustness
Dierent types of districts may display dierent relationships among the variables. Similarly,
it is important to use other specications to see if the regression results are similar. In order
to do robustness check, I have divided all the prosecutorial districts into large population and
small population districts and then into rich and poor districts. I used the median values of
population and per-capita income to make these divisions. Then, I have used a log-log regression
model to see that the results are similar.
Table 12 provides us with the results of the regressions when the full sample is divided
into two parts: large population and small population districts. We can see that some of the
variables such as per-capita income and population that were signicant in the regressions in
Table 10 are still signicant for both the rich and the poor districts. However, the variables
such as Percentage of Votes that President Bush won in 2000 election and Total Area are only
signicant in the regression for large population districts. This re
ects the fact that there are
some xed costs in running a prosecutorial oce. A poor district cannot reduce a prosecutorial
budget on ideological grounds if it has to remain functioning properly. The rural population
has a signicant coecient only for the small population districts. This means that only scantly
populated rural areas will get smaller budgets, but the more populated urban areas will not
show any such tendency.
[Table 12 here]
Similarly, Table 13 provides the regressions results for the rich and poor districts separately.
We can see a similar pattern as the previous regression where some of the variables are signicant
in the full sample and also in rich and poor districts, but there are few variables such as
Percentage of Votes that President Bush in November 2000 Election, that is only signicant in
the regression for rich districts.
19[Table 13 here]
Lastly, Table 14 provides the log-log model where I have taken the logarithm of both the de-
pendent variable and the independent variables before running the regressions. The coecients
in this regression can be interpreted as elasticities. Therefore, no separate table for elasticities
is given. All the major results of this paper also hold in the log-log model.
[Table 14 here]
5 Conclusion
This paper examines why the budgets of the state prosecutors vary so much across the
United States. The paper develops a theoretical framework that captures the key institutional
and strategic factors that determine the budgets of state prosecutors. I derived various policy
implications and testable hypotheses from the theoretical model and showed that these hypothe-
ses are supported by empirical analysis using a dataset that I constructed for this purpose. The
empirical analysis brought to light some interesting results such as other things remaining the
same, the prosecutorial budgets decrease with the increase in political conservatism as measured
by the percentage of votes President Bush won in November 2000 election and that the prosecu-
torial budget is larger for the districts where the prosecutors are appointed rather than elected.
The latter result coupled with one of the results of Ramseyer, Rasmusen, and Raghav (2006)
where we show that other things remaining the same, the appointed prosecutors prosecute less
cases and have lower convictions rates, highlights the importance of giving right incentives to
the prosecutors.
Prosecutorial budget is an important determinant of the society's ability to ght crime. Pre-
vious studies have treated the prosecutorial budget as exogenously determined while examining
the allocation of it to dierent uses. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the
factors that determine these budgets. Another contribution of this research is creation of a
unique dataset that will be useful for other researchers who are studying similar issues. I plan
to make this data publicly available in near future.
Further study of this important topic is needed. Unavailability of data on the budgets of
the local governments prevented me from estimating a full 
edged structural model. Also, the
empirical analysis with a panel data instead of merely a cross-section would have helped to
20answer questions that cannot be answered otherwise. However, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
has not conducted any census of prosecutors other than the one in 2001. When these become
available in future, it will be possible to do a more comprehensive analysis of the budgets of the
state prosecutors.
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24Appendix A: Proofs
Proof. Lemma 1:
The equilibrium in this model consists of the maximized utilities of both the social planner
and the prosecutor. So the proof of the existence of an equilibrium consists of proving the
existence of a maximum in the utility functions of the social planner and the prosecutor. For
c  c, we know that both the social planner and the prosecutor will get an innitely large utility.
Therefore, there cannot be any equilibrium for under those circumstances. Since the functions
U(:) and V (:) are strictly increasing and concave when c < c, we know that a maximum will
exist for both of them and furthermore, this maximum will be unique. To prove the second part
of this lemma, consider the following:
max
R
h(c   c(R)) + k(B   R) ; (5)
subject to R  B.
The Lagrangian L is equal to
L = h(c   c(R)) + k(B   R) +  (B   R) (6)
The Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions are:
dL
dR
= [h0(c   c(R))] [ c0(R)]   k0(B   R)    = 0; (7)
and
  (B   R) = 0: (8)
The complimentary slackness (8) states that either  = 0 and (B  R) > 0 or  > 0 and
(B  R) = 0. Therefore, when there is a corner solution (B = R),  = 0. Substituting this
in the rst order condition (7) we get,
h0(c   c(R)) [ c0(R)] > k0(B   R): (9)
When there is an interior solution  = 0, and substituting this in the rst order condition (7)
25we get,
h0(c   c(R)) [ c0(R)] = k0(B   R): (10)

Proof. Proposition 1:
For the case of an interior solution, rearranging terms in equation (7), we get
[h0(c   c(R))] [ c0(R)] = k0(B   R): (11)
When B increases exogenously, the only way for this equality to hold is for h0(:) and/or
[ c0(:)] to decline. Since h0(:) > 0 and h00(:) < 0 and  c0(:) > 0 and  c00(:) < 0. , the value of R
will need to increase in order to reduce both h0(:) and  c0(:). In the case of a corner solution, all
the budget goes to combat crime. Small increases in budget will not induce an interior solution
and any additional amount of budget will be utilized to lower the crime rate. 
Proof. Proposition 2:
From equation (10), we get equation (11) by rearranging terms. An exogenous increase in c
results in a decrease in h0(:) because h00(:) < 0. Thus, the only way to maintain the equality is
by reducing k0(:) on the right hand side. This is only possible by an increase in its argument,
B   R. Thus, R decreases with an increase in c. 
Proof. Proposition 3:
From equation (1), we derive the rst order condition for the baseline model. After rear-
ranging the terms in the rst order condition, we get,
f0(c   c(R(B))) [c0(R(B))] [R0(B)] = g0(X   B): (12)
An increase in X will reduce the right hand side of the above equation because g00(:) < 0.
In order to maintain the equality, B must increase on the left hand side to reduce left land side
and maintain equality. 
26Proof. Lemma 2:
Please see the beginning of proof for Lemma 1 for the proof of existence of equilibrium.
max
R
[ h(c   c(
R)) ] + k(B   R) ; (13)
subject to R  B:
The Lagrangian L is equal to
L = [ h(c   c(
R)) ] + k(B   R) +  (B   R) (14)
The Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions are:
dL
dR
= h0(c   c(
R)) [ c0(
R)] 
   k0(B   R)    = 0; (15)
and,
 (B   R) = 0: (16)
The complimentary slackness condition (16) states that either  = 0 and (B   R) > 0 or
 > 0 and (B R) = 0. Therefore, when there is corner solution (B = R), we have  = 0.




 > k0(B   R): (17)





 = k0(B   R): (18)

Proof. Proposition 4:
An increase in 
 results in an increase in the eective of resources that are spent to ght
crime. Because such an increase results in increase in productivity of R, the prosecutor will
27spend more resources in ghting crime when there is interior solution. From equation (18), we
know that there will be an interior when h0(c c(
R)) [ c0(
R)] 
 = k0(B R). Now, sup-
pose there an an exogenous increase in 
. This will reduce both h0(:) and [ c0(:)] because both
h00(:) < 0 and [ c00(:) < 0]. However an increase in 
 will increase the 
 on the left hand side of
the above equation. There, the net result of an increase in 
 can be determined without further
information about the functional forms of h(:) and c(:) and value of 
. This is only possible when
(B   R) decreases because k00(:). We can argue along the same lines in case we have a cor-
ner solution. The net result of an increase in 
 is also not certain in the case of corner solution. 
Proof. Proposition 5:




k0(B   R) 8 R 2 [0;B]. In this situation, all the resources will be devoted to ghting crime
and an increase in  will not have any eect. However, a big decrease in  can change a corner
solution to an interior solution. Now consider equation (18) for the case where this is an inte-
rior solution. When  increases, in order to maintain the equality specied in the rst order
condition, R will have to increase because only an increase in R will lower h0(:) as h00(:) < 0.
Similarly, a decrease in  will lead to reallocation of resources from crime ghting to furthering
agenda of the prosecutor. 
Proof. Proposition 6:
From equation (3), we can derive the rst order condition of the utility maximization problem









)   B) (20)
An increase in  will have two eects on the above equation. It will increase the left hand
side of the equation. To counterbalance this increase that comes from increase in , f0(:) and
28 c0(:)will have to decrease, which means an increase in B. However, because  also aects X,
the total amount of resources available the social planner, the right hand side of the equation
has also decreased (because g00(:) < 0). This should result in a decrease in B and increase in
X  B if we want to maintain the equality. Thus, how the resources will be reallocated due to
an increase in  is not clear from the rst order condition. 
29Appendix B: Notation
 A measure of social planner's level of political conservatism.
 Discount factor that measures the political pressure on a prosecutor for keeping a low crime rate.

 A measure of eectiveness of the resources that are spent on reducing crime rate.
c The actual crime rate (per-capita crime).
c The critical level of crime rate at which there is a great social unrest.
R The amount of resources from the prosecutorial budget that the prosecutor uses to contain the crime.
B Prosecutorial Budget that the prosecutor gets from the social planner.
X The total amount of resources of the social planner.
f(:) The utility derived by the social planner by a lower crime rate compared to a critical level.
g(:) The utility derived by the social planner by expenditure on other items such as roads and schools.
h(:) The utility derived by the prosecutor from a lower crime rate compared to some critical level.
k(:) The utility derived by the prosecutor from spending resources on his own agenda.
30Appendix C: Data
The variables used in the empirical analysis are dened as follows, all at the state prosecu-
torial district level:
1. The Census of Prosecutors, 2001: The data from this census is available at the fol-
lowing URL: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/psc01.htm. It is the rst time
that Bureau of Justice Statistics, the statistical arm of Department of Justice covered
all the prosecutorial districts in their survey. Earlier survey included randomly selected
districts only. The unit of aggregation from the variables taken from this source is Prosecu-
torial district. A prosecutorial district may consist of two or more state counties. However,
most of the prosecutorial districts consist of only one county. The variables that I obtained
from this data for the present study are listed below:
a) Prosecutorial Budget: The annual budget that prosecutors get mostly from the
local governments as county and municipal governments.
b) Composition of Districts: Each prosecutorial district consists of one or more of
state counties. The Census of Prosecutors, 2001 contains this composition of pros-
ecutorial districts in terms of state counties. I have used this information to merge
variables taken from dierent datasets that were at dierent levels of aggregation.
c) Appointed or Not: A binary variable which indicates whether the prosecutor was
appointed or elected. It is one for districts where the prosecutors are appointed.
Prosecutors in all the districts in Alaska, Connecticut, New Jersey, and District of
Columbia are appointed by their respective state Attorney Generals.
d) Years in Oce: The number of years the current prosecutor has been in oce.
e) Term of Oce: It is the number of years a prosecutor will hold the oce after being
elected or appointed before the next election or reappointment.
2. Uniform Crime Report, 2001: The uniform crime report is made by Federal Bureau
of Investigation to measure the level of crime across dierent parts of the United States. It
provides data about certain serious crimes reported to dierent law enforcement agencies
across the counties such as police or sheri departments. These serious crimes include
31murders, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts,
and arsons. This report for the year 2001 can be obtained from the following URL:
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01cius.htm. This data was available at the level of counties
of states. I aggregated this data to the prosecutorial district level.
a) Aggregate Number of Index Crimes: I have constructed a variable called aggre-
gate index crime by summing all these crimes for every county.
3. Census Data of Year 2000: Data can be downloaded from individual tables available
at the following URL: http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html. All of the data
that I got from this source was available at the county level of aggregation. So I aggregated
this data to the prosecutorial district level.
a) Housing Density: The number of housing units in a district divided by the total
land area of that district.
b) Males with No Schooling: Number of males with no schooling in a district.
c) Males between Ages of 15 and 24: Number of males between the ages of 15 and
24 in a district.
d) Metropolitan Statistical Area: A binary variable which is 1 for districts that lies
in Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 otherwise.
e) Monthly Median Rent: The median monthly rent of housing units in a district.
f) Number of People who are Employed: Number of people who are employed in
a district.
g) Number of Houses that are Occupied: Number of housing units that are occupied
in a district.
h) Per-capita Income: Per-capita income of a prosecutorial district.
i) Population: Population of a prosecutorial district.
j) Population Density: Population of a district divided by the total land area (ex-
cluded water area) of that district.
k) Rural Population: Number of people who live in rural areas in a district.
l) Total Area: The total area of a district.
324. Year 2000 Presidential Election Results: Data about number of votes won by dier-
ent candidates in November 2000 presidential election is taken from Center of Congressional
and Presidential Studies at American University. It is available over the internet at the
following URL: http://spa.american.edu/ccps/pages.php?ID=12. This data was also
available at the level of counties. Therefore, I aggregated it to the prosecutorial district
level.
a) Bush Votes: The number of votes won by President Bush in November 2000 election.
This variable measures the strength of the level of political conservatism of a district
around the year 2000.
b) Percentage of Bush Votes: I constructed this variable from the above variable
by dividing the votes that President Bush won in November 2000 election with the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3: Term of Oce in Dierent Prosecutorial Districts in 2001











Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 4: Years in Oce of Current Prosecutors











Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 5: Frequency Distribution of the Population









Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 6: Prosecutorial Budget across Districts
Budget Amount Number of Districts
$0 - $100000 386
$100000 - $200000 386
$200000 - $300000 265
$300000 - $400000 180
$400000 - $500000 130
$500000 - $1000000 305
$1000000 - $2000000 223
$2000000 - $3000000 71
$3000000 - $4000000 45
$4000000 - $5000000 25
$5000000 - $6000000 10
$6000000 - $7000000 15
$7000000 - $8000000 6
$8000000 - $9000000 5
$9000000 - $10000000 3
$10000000 + 10
Total 2065
Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 7: Per-capita Income in the Year 2000










Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 8: Number of Index crimes across Districts
















Notes: For the denition of the variables, please see Data Appendix B.Table 9: Number of Prosecutorial Districts in various States




























North Carolina 39 1.67
North Dakota 53 2.26
Nebraska 93 3.97
New Hampshire 10 0.43
New Jersey 21 0.9
New Mexico 14 0.6
Nevada 17 0.73





Rhode Island 1 0.04
South Carolina 16 0.68State Number of Districts Percent








West Virginia 55 2.35
Wyoming 23 0.98
Total 2341 100























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Social planner (or local
governments in real life)
decides how much money to
allocate to Prosecutors
Prosecutors decide how
much of the budget to spend
on reducing crime and how
much of to spend it on their
own agendas.Histogram of Key Variables
Figure 2: Prosecutorial Budget Figure 3: Logarithm of Prosecutorial Budget
Figure 4: Population Figure 5: Logarithm of PopulationFigure 6: Number of Index Crimes Figure 7: Logarithm of Number
of Index Crimes
Figure 8: Per-Capita Income Figure 9: Logarithm of
Per-Capita IncomeFigure 10: Votes Won by Figure 11: Logarithm of Votes
President Bush in Won by President Bush
November 2000 Election in November 2000 ElectionScatter Plots between Prosecutorial Budget and Key Independent
Variables on Logarithmic Scale
Figure 12: Prosecutorial Budget and Population Figure 13: Prosecutorial Budget and Crime
Figure 14: Prosecutorial Budget Figure 15: Prosecutorial Budget and
and Aggregate Income Percentage of Votes President
Bush Won in November 2000